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People v. Reilly 235
(decided Jan. 20, 1994)
The defendant claimed that his right to be free from illegal
searches and seizures was violated under both the State23 6 and
Federal 237 Constitutions when two deputies conducted a
warrantless search of his property. 23 8 The defendant claimed that

the area the deputies entered was constitutionally protected under
the doctrine of "curtilage." 23 9 The court held that, although the
area was not within the curtilage, it was constitutionally protected
because of the defendant's affirmative acts to maintain
privacy. 240 Thus, the court concluded that the deputies illegally
entered the defendant's property. 24 1
The controversy at issue arose when two deputies walked onto
the defendant's property. 24 2 They gained access by walking

through a field, along a fence, through a heavily wooded area,
235. 195 A.D.2d 95, 606 N.Y.S.2d 836 (3d Dep't 1994).
236. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. This provision provides in relevant part:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated... ." Id.
237. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. This section states in relevant part: "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " Id.
238. Reilly, 195 A.D.2d at 98. 606 N.Y.S.2d at 837. Defendant's property
consisted of a 10 acre parcel which included a cottage located 425 feet from
defendant's residence within an area of mown grass and landscaped
surroundings. Id. at 97-99, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 837-39. No fence surrounded the
residence, and there was an unmowed area of brush and small trees about 160
to 180 feet from the residence which separated the residence, its yard and the
outbuildings from the cottage. Id. at 99, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 839.
239. Id. at 98, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 838 ("Curtilage is generally defined as an
area that is related to the 'intimate.activities of the home.'" (quoting People v.
Reynolds, 71 N.Y.2d 552, 558, 523 N.E.2d 291, 297, 528 N.Y.S.2d 15, 21
(1988)). See BLACK'S LAv DICTIONARY 348 (6th ed. 1990) (defining curtilage
as "the land or grounds surrounding the dwelling, which are necessary and
convenient and habitually used for family purposes and carrying on domestic
employment").
240. Reilly, 195 A.D.2d at 99-100, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 838-40.
241. Id. at 99, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 840.
242. Id. at 97, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 837.
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and then proceeding through a break in the fence. 243 Having
gained access to the defendant's property, the deputies stood near
a cottage located near the defendant's residence. 2 44 While there,

they smelled marijuana from the vent of the air conditioner
located in the cottage. 2 4 5 Next, they walked through a "small
wooded" area located near the defendant's residence and found
marijuana plants growing. 2 4 6 Finally, they left the premises and
obtained a search warrant for the cottage. 2 4 7 The warrant was
executed and marijuana plants were seized from the defendant's

property. 24 8 The defendant was subsequently arrested on a
charge of "criminal possession of marijuana in the first degree
and unlicensed growing of marijuana." 24 9
On appeal, the defendant claimed that the deputies had illegally
entered the "curtilage" of his residence. 2 5 0 The court held that
243. Id. The deputies entered the property by:
[W]alking over an adjacent field, following the fence along defendant's
east line more than 1,400 feet and into a heavily wooded area north of
defendant's property, and then traversing a break in the fence line at the
rear of defendant's property. They then walked out of the woods and
across defendant's property several hundred feet to a cottage behind
defendant's residence ....
Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 97, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 837-38.
247. Id. at 97, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 838.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 98, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 839. First, the cottage was 425 feet away,
and the brush area and small trees were 160 to 180 feet from the residence. Id.
at 99, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 839. Second, there was no fence surrounding the
residence, and an unmowed portion of brush and trees separated the residence
from the cottage. Id. Although the court noted that the cottage itself was within
an area of mown grass and was surrounded by a pond, gazebo and lawn
furniture, this was still insufficient to satisfy the second factor as analyzed. Id.
Third, even though there was no "objective data" possessed by the deputies to
indicate that the cottage "was not being used for intimate activities of the
home," the cottage was vacant and a strong odor of marijuana emanated from
it. Id. Although the defendant had testified at the suppression hearing that the
area was used for "backyard" activities, the cottage contained marijuana
plants, hoses for irrigation and a timer to control the lights and temperature.
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the deputies had not, in fact, entered the defendant's curtilage. 2 5 1

The court reasoned that the proximity of the area claimed to be
within the curtilage of the defendant's residence was too far
removed from such residence to be within the curtilage. 2 5 2 The
court concluded that defendant's cottage, the immediate area
surrounding it, and the unmowed area where the patches of
marijuana were seen, did not fall within the definition of
253
curtilage.

The court, however, held that the defendant's suppression
motion should have been granted. 254 The court determined that
the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area
on which the deputies walked, and stated that:
[T]he property was bounded on tEi south by a road, on the north
by heavy woods and a low wire fence and on tie east and west
by a pretension steel fence that appeared electrified. [Ihe
cottage was surrounded by a well-mown lawn, lines of shrubs, a
pond containing a dock and diving board, as well as a gazebo
and patio. 2 55

All of the precautions, despite the absence of "No Trespassing"
signs, demonstrated the owner's expectation of privacy. 256 The
court held that where a person's property is substantially
enclosed on all sides and well cared for, the landowner has

d. at 99, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 839. These facts indicated to the deputies that the
cottage was not "'associated with the activities and privacies of domestic life'"
as they would have been had the cottage been part of defendant's residence. Id.
(quoting United States v. Dunn, 180 U.S. 291, 303 (1987)). In addition, in
Dunn, the Court stated that the third factor - use put to the area - was an
"especially significant" factor. Id. at 98, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 839 (quoting Dttn.,
480 U.S. at 302). Fourth, even though the area may not be readily visible to
the public, the defendant did not have fences to prevent persons from
observing the area and cottage which were 750 feet from the road. Id. at 98,
606 N.Y.S.2d at 839.
251. Id. at 99, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 839.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 101, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 840.
255. Id.
256. Id.
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indicated an expectation of privacy therein. 257 Since the
application for the search warrant was based upon observations
made by deputies during their illegal entry, the warrant was not
legally sufficient and all of the evidence obtained through the

execution of the warrant was suppressed. 25 8
The court based its holding upon the proposition stated in
People v. Scott.2 5 9 The court in Scott held that when persons

"post 'No Trespassing' signs on their private property or, by
some other means, indicate unmistakably that entry is not
permitted, . . . their
privacy
rights
will
be
.
intrusions
and ... they will be free from unwanted

respected
. . .

"260

257. Id.

258. Id.
259. Id. See People v. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d 474, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 583
N.Y.S.2d 920 (1992). The court in Reilly determined that Scott could be
applied retroactively. Reilly, 195 A.D.2d at 100, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 840. The
court applied a "three-factor test" to determine the retroactivity of Scott. Id. at
100, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 839. The three-factor test required consideration of "(1)
the purpose served by the new rule, (2) the extent of reliance on the old rule,
and (3) the effect on the administration of justice of the retroactive application
of the new rule." Id. at 100, 606 N..Y.S.2d at 839-40 (citations omitted).
Using this test, the court determined that Scott would apply retroactively in this
case. Id. at 101, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 840. In this regard, the court refused to
follow Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984), which reaffirmed the
"open fields" doctrine, stating that there is no personal or societal privacy
expectation in open fields and therefore warrantless observations are allowed.
Id. at 99, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 838.
260. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 491, 593 N.E.2d at 1338, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 930.
The defendant lived in a mobile home near a two-lane highway. Id. at 479,
593 N.E.2d at 1331, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 923. In 1987, a person was deer hunting
and followed the deer onto the defendant's property. Id. at 479, 593 N.E.2d at
1330, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 922. When on the property, he saw what seemed to be
the remains of marijuana plants. Id. In July of 1988, the hunter went onto
defendant's property again and he saw about 50 marijuana plants growing. Id.
He reported this to the police and the police asked him to get a leaf from one
of the plants, which he did. Id. A police officer went back with the hunter to
the defendant's property to observe the plants; these visits were not authorized
by the defendant. Id. Thereafter, the police used the hunter's statement as
probable cause to obtain a warrant to search the defendant's property. Id. The
defendant had 'No Trespassing' signs conspicuously posted around his
property. Id. at 479, 593 N.E.2d at 1330-31, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 922-23.
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The federal standard for determining whether land is within
"curtilage" was most recently summarized in United States v.
Dunn.26 1 The Court in Dunn explained that curtilage is the place
that is "so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be
placed under the home's 'umbrella' of Fourth Amendment
protection." 262 The Court articulated four factors which it
believed should be considered when determining if an area is
within the constitutionally protected curtilage area. 263 Those. four
factors are:
[TJhe proximity of the area claimed to be curdlage to the home,
whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the
261. 480 U.S. 294 (1987). In 1980, the defendant was found by the Drug
Enforcement Administration [hereinafter DEA] to have purchased equipment
that was used to produce amphetamine and phenylacetone. Id. at 296. The
DEA agents obtained a warrant which permitted them to install beepers at the
defendant's home in various locations. Id. The beeper transmissions indicated
that one of the containers of chemicals was being taken to a ranch which was
owned by the defendant. Id. at 297. Two days later, officers entered the
property without a warrant. Id.
Respondent's ranch comprised approximately 198 acres and was
completely encircled by a perimeter fence. The property also contained
several interior fences, constructed mainly of posts and multiple strands
of barbed wire. The ranch residence was situated a half a mile from a
public road. A fence encircled the residence and a nearby small
greenhouse. Two barns were located approximately fifty yards from this
fence. The front of the larger of the two barns was enclosed by a
wooden fence and had an open overhang. Locked, waist-high gates
barred entry into the barn proper, and netting material stretched from
the ceiling to the top of the wooden gates.
Id. A DEA agent entered the defendant's property by "crossing] over the
perimeter fence and one interior fence." Id. At that point, the agents smelled
phenylacetic acid from the barn. Id. They went toward the barn by crossing
over a barbed wire fence. Id. The officers saw nothing incriminating in the
barn. Id. Next, they proceeded to a larger barn ovned by the defendant by
crossing over another barbed wire fence and a wooden fence. Id. at 297-98.
The officers shone a light into the barn and saw a phenylacetone laboratory.
Id. at 298. The officers obtained a warrant to enter the ranch after
subsequently visiting the barn two more times. Id. The defendant was
subsequently arrested. Id. at 298-99.
262. Id. at 301.
263. Id.
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home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the
steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation
264
by people passing by.

Using these considerations, the Court determined that the
defendant's barn and the area immediately surrounding it were
not within the curtilage, and it was proper to enter upon it.265
The New York Court of Appeals refused to follow the "open
fields" doctrine enumerated in Oliver v. United States,2 6 6 thereby
affording defendants greater protection from unreasonable
searches and seizures under New York law than they receive
under federal law.

FOURTH DEPARTMENT
7

26
People v. LaMendola
(decided November 16, 1994)

The People brought this action to appeal the decision by the
Genesee county court to suppress evidence obtained from pen
269
registers2 6 8 having the capability of monitoring conversations.

In making this determination, the county court retroactively
applied the rule stated in People v. Bialostok,270 holding that pen
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. 466 U.S. at 178-79 (holding that there is no legitimate expectation of
privacy in "open fields").
267. 206 A.D.2d 207, 619 N.Y.S.2d 901 (4th Dep't 1994).
268. A "pen register" is an instrument that "records or decodes electronic
or other impulses that identify the numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted on
a telephone line." Id. at 208. 619 N.Y.S.2d at 902. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 705.00 (McKinney Supp. 1995).
269. LaMendola, 206 A.D.2d at 208, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 902.
270. 80 N.Y.2d 738, 610 N.E.2d 374, 594 N.Y.S.2d 701 (1993). In
Bialostok, pen registers were utilized to determine the nature of defendant's
illegal betting. Id. at 742, 610 N.E.2d at 375-76, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 702-03. The
court held that where a pen register has the capacity to monitor telephone
conversations, although malfunctioning, such pen registers will be treated as an
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